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LEARNED TREATISES AND RULE 8-03(b) (18) OF THE PROPOSED
FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE
INTRODUCTION

The most recent contribution in the long continued trend' toward
evidentiary reform is the Proposed Rules of Evidence for the United
States District Courts and Magistrates.! These Federal Rules of
Evidence' represent an attempt to conform federal practice to the
the demands of modern litigation and society.' As a result of the
liberalization of procedures5 as well as the continued growth in the
educational level of jury members,6 an atmosphere conducive to such
reform has been created. It is in reaction to this environment that the
Rules may find substance.'
The principle of hearsay, however, has suffered a most vigorous
1. The trend began with the Rule Making Act of June 1934; Rules of Court
Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1964). This initially resulted in the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, effective September 16, 1938. Rule 43(a) of these rules was promulgated
to fill the resulting evidentiary gap. There followed several other attempts: the ALl
Model Code of Evidence in 1942; the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform Laws proposed the Uniform Rules of Evidence in 1953; the California
Rules became effective January 1, 1967 and were based on the Uniform Rules but
modified to comply with state policies; the New Jersey Evidence Act of 1960 established
portions of the Uniform Rules; and the Supreme Court of New Jersey Rules of
Evidence which became effective September 11, 1967.
2. FED. R. EviD., 46 F.R.D. 161 (Prelim. Draft 1969).
3. Sabatina v. Curtiss Nat'l Bank, 415 F.2d 632 (5th Cir. 1969) ; United States
v. 60.14 Acres of Land, 362 F.2d 660 (3d Cir. 1966) ; Dallas County v. Commercial
Union Assur. Co., 286 F.2d 388 (5th Cir. 1961); Fleury v. Edwards, 14 N.Y.2d
334, 341, 200 N.E.2d 550, 554, 251 N.Y.S.2d 647, 653 (1964).
4. FED. R. EviD., 46 F.R.D. 161 (Prelim. Draft 1969).
The materials supporting the need for uniform Rules of Evidence are
impressive and, unanimously, the members of the Committee have tentatively
concluded that1. Rules of Evidence applied in the Federal Courts should be
improved; and
2. Rules of Evidence which would be uniform throughout the Federal
court system, are both advisable and feasible.
Id. at 177.
5. An example might be the liberalization of pretrial discovery procedures.
FED. R. Civ. P. 26-36.
6. ALl MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE 8, 9 (1942); Weinstein, Devising Evidentiary
Statistical evidence of this rising level of
Rules, 66 COLUM. L. REv. 223 (1966).
education can be found in the U.S. BUREAU OF CENSUS, STAT. ABS. OF U.S. 121

(90th ed. 1969).
7. Smith, The Hearsay Rule and the Docket Crisis: The Futile Search for
Paradise, 54 A.B.A.J. 231 (1968); Weinstein, Devising Evidentiary Rules, 66 COLUm.
L. REv. 223 (1966).
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assault' because of its myriad exceptions.' The practical difficulty in
judicial application of the rule has led courts to refuse to view hearsay
as a "strait-jacketing, hypertechnical body of semantical slogans to be
mechanically invoked regardless of the proffered evidence""0 with the
result that they have embarked upon a period of creative expansion."
The most viable legislative solutions offered in response for adoption are
threefold:12 abolish the rule against hearsay and admit all such
evidence,"3 abandon the classification of exceptions and admit hearsay
possessing probative force,'" or revise the present system of class exceptions. The Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure has chosen
the final alternative and has implemented it in the form of Article Eight
of the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence. The purpose of this note is
to examine the validity of this attempt as it relates to Rule 8-03 (b) (18)
dealing with learned treatises.
THE CURRENT LAW ON LEARNED TREATISES

The Common Law
It is generally accepted that learned treatises are hearsay and,
therefore, not admissible to prove the truth of the statements they
contain.' 5 The cogent consideration in support of this position is that
8.

"Exceptions to the hearsay rule have virtually swallowed the rule." De La

Salle Institute v. United States, 195 F. Supp. 891, 894 (N.D. Cal. 1961).
9. Booker & Morton, The Hearsay Rule, St. George Plays and the Road to the
Year Twenty-Fifty, 44 NOTRE DAME LAW. 7 (1968), have compiled a list of sources with
a varying number of exceptions:
MODEL CODE RULES 503-18, 520-30 (27 exceptions); 2 E. CONRAD, MODERN
(16 exceptions) ; T. GREEN & C. HARPER, THE
TRIAL EVID. 673 (1956)
GEORGIA LAW OF EVID. 235-326 (1957) (48 exceptions by our best count);
1 S. GREENLEAF, EVIDENCE 175 (14th ed. 1883) (5 exceptions) ; H. KELLEY,
(4 or, perhaps, 5
CRIMINAL LAW AND PAvcICE 227-32 (3d ed. 1913)
(13 exceptions);
exceptions) ; R. KENNEDY, TRIAL EVIDENCE 76-126 (1909)
MORGAN, Foreword to MODEL CODE at 38 (18 exceptions); J. WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE § 1426 (3d ed. 1940) (14 exceptions); J. WIGMORE, CODE OF
EVIDENCE 151-70 (3d ed. 1942) (20 exceptions) ; UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE
63 (31 exceptions).

Id. at 10-11 n.22.
10. United States v. Castellana, 349 F.2d 264, 276 (2d Cir. 1965).
11. Sabatina v. Curtiss Nat'l Bank, 415 F.2d 632 (5th Cir. 1969) ; Dallas County
v. Commercial Union Assur. Co., 286 F.2d 388

(5th Cir. 1961).

The license for

such expansion is found in FED. R. Civ. P. 43.
12. FED. R. EVID., 46 F.R.D. 161, 325-28 (Prelim.

Draft 1969) ; Weinstein,
Alternatives to the Present Hearsay Rules, 44 F.R.D. 375 (1968) ; Weinstein, Probative Force of Hearsay, 46 IOWA L. REV. 331 (1960).

13. Cf. MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE 503.
14. Weinstein, Probative Force of Hearsay, 46 IOWA L. REV. 331 (1960) ; FED.
R. EvID., 46 F.R.D. 161, 327 n.2 (Prelim. Draft 1969).
15. Stottlemire v. Cawood, 215 F. Supp. 266 (D.D.C. 1963) ; Trustees of Pencader
Presby. Church v. Gibson, 26 Del. Ch. 357, 22 A.2d 782 (1941); Isley v. Little, 219
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it places the opinion of an uncross-examined author before the jury.
This results in the lack of opportunity to test the accuracy or weight of
the statement. " Two jurisdictions, Alabama and Wisconsin, rationalize
admission by acknowledging first, difficulty in obtaining competent
medical testimony, and second, that professional knowledge is in a great
degree derived from treatises of the particular profession." The landmark cases"8 from these jurisdictions suggest no further substitute for
cross-examination. They do, however, require 9 that the proponent
demonstrate that the treatise is a standard or authoritative work.20
The exclusionary rule set forth above has been held inapplicable
to historical works of deceased authors being of general notoriety and
interest 2 ' or books on exact sciences,2 2 e.g., mortality tables,23 annuity
Ga. 23, 131 S.E.2d 623 (1963); Brown v. Collins, 223 So. 2d 453 (La. App. 1969);
Guidry v. Grain Dealers Mut Ins. Co., 193 So. 2d 873 (La. App. 1967) ; Zubryski v.
Minneapolis St. Ry. Co., 243 Minn. 450, 68 N.W.2d 489 (1955) ; Milner Enterprises v.
Jacobs, 207 So. 2d 85 (Miss. 1968) ; McComish v. DeSoi, 83 N.J. Super. 505, 200
A.2d 511 (1964); Koury v. Follo, 272 N.C. 366, 158 S.E.2d 548 (1968); Piotrowski
v. Corey Hosp., 172 Ohio St. 61, 176 N.E.2d 355 (1961) ; Gulf Oil Corp. v. Miller,
198 Okla. 54, 175 P.2d 335 (1946); Eckleberry v. Kaiser Found. N. Hosp., 226 Ore.
616, 359 P.2d 1090 (1961).
16. Colorificio Italiano Max Meyer S.P.A. v. S.S. Hellenic Wave, 419 F.2d
223 (5th Cir. 1969) ; Stottlemire v. Cawood, 215 F. Supp. 266 (D.D.C. 1963) ; United
States v. National Homes Corp., 196 F. Supp. 370 (N.D. Ind. 1961) ; United States v.
United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 349 (D. Mass. 1950); Zubryski v. Minneapolis
St. Ry. Co., 243 Minn. 450, 68 N.W.2d 489 (1955); Milner Enterprises v. Jacobs,
207 So. 2d 85 (Miss. 1968); Koury v. Follo, 272 N.C. 366, 158 S.E.2d 548 (1968);
Eckleberry v. Kaiser Found. N. Hosp., 226 Ore. 616, 359 P.2d 1090 (1961).
17. Franklin v. State, 29 Ala. App. 306, 197 So. 55 (1940) ; City of Dothan v.
Hardy, 237 Ala. 603, 188 So. 264 (1939); Stoudenmeier v. Williamson, 29 Ala. 558
(1857) ; Halldin v. Peterson, 39 Wis. 2d 668, 159 N.W.2d 738 (1969); Lewandowski
v. Preferred Mut. Ins. Co., 33 Wis. 2d 69, 146 N.W.2d 505 (1966).
18. Stoudenmeier v. Williamson, 29 Ala. 558 (1857); Lewandowski v. Preferred
Mut. Ins. Co., 33 Wis. 2d 69, 146 N.W.2d 505 (1966).
19. This, of course, is in addition to relevance and authentication which is
always required of such evidence. See generally 5 WIGmORE, EVIDENCE § 1424 (3d
ed. 1940) [hereinafter cited as WIGMORE].
20. Smarr v. State, 260 Ala. 30, 68 So. 2d 6 (1953); Stoudenmeier v. Williamson, 29 Ala. 558 (1857) ; Lewandowski v. Preferred Mut. Ins. Co., 33 Wis. 2d 69, 146
N.W.2d 505 (1966).
21. Morris v. Harmer's Heirs, 10 U.S. (7 Pet.) 554 (1833) ; Rautbord v.
Ehmann, 190 F.2d 533 (7th Cir. 1951); Montana Power Co. v. F.P.C., 185 F.2d
491 (D.C. Cir. 1950); Trustees of Pencader Presby. Church v. Gibson, 26 Del. Ch. 375,
22 A.2d 782 (1941); Lazell v. Boardman, 103 Me. 292, 69 A. 97 (1908) ; Eckleberry
v. Kaiser Found. N. Hosp., 226 Ore. 616, 359 P.2d 1090 (1961).
22. Nix v. Hedded, 149 U.S. 304 (1892); Bixby v. Omaha & C. B. Ry. &
Bridge Co., 105 Iowa 293, 75 N.W. 182 (1898); Guidry v. Grain Dealers Mut. Ins.
Co., 193 So. 2d 873 (La. App. 1967); Catholic Diocese of Natchez-Jackson v. Jaquith,
224 So. 2d 216 (Miss. 1969).
23. Kershaw v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 415 F.2d 1009 (5th Cir. 1969) ; Roberts
v. United States, 316 F.2d 489 (3d Cir. 1963) ; Minnesota Amusement Co. v. Larkin,
299 F.2d 142 (8th Cir. 1962) ; Kenebs v. Kettle, 406 F.2d 1951 (D.C. Cir. 1968);
Danzios v. Kelly, 112 Ill. App. 2d 14, 250 N.E.2d 801 (1969); Sherman v. City of
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tables,"' tide tables and almanacs." Works of living and available
authors,2" however, or treatises dealing with inductive or inexact
sciences 2 are generally held inadmissible.2
When the texts are offered only for impeachment purposes and not
as independent evidence of the facts in issue, the hearsay objection is not
appropriate." Consequently, the majority view allows use of treatises
on cross-examination, but the extent varies with the jurisdictions. It is
generally agreed that where the witness has relied upon a particular
treatise to support his opinion, he may be cross-examined from that
treatise to demonstrate that such support is not forthcoming." Some
jurisdictions confine use of the treatise to only these circumstances."
A broader view recognizes that where the witness has relied upon
treatises generally,"2 works other than those specifically referred to may
Springfield, 111 Ill. App. 2d 391, 250 N.E.2d 537 (1969); Howard v. Gulf Mobile &

Ohio R.R. Co., 13 Ill. App. 2d 482, 142 N.E.2d 825 (1957); Budd v. Erie Lackawanna
R.R. Co., 98 N.J. Super. 47, 236 A.2d 143 (1967) ; Horton v. State, 50 Misc. 2d 1017,
272 N.Y.S.2d 312 (Ct. Cl. 1966).
24. Continental Oil Co. v. Elias, 307 P.2d 849 (Okla. 1957).
25. Pendry v. Addison, 105 Ga. App. 673, 125 S.E.2d 523 (1962); Fields v.
Jackson, 102 Ga. App. 117, 115 S.E.2d 877 (1960); Gaphill v. Bergman, 108 N.H.
507, 240 A.2d 55 (1968).
26. Morris v. Harmer's Heirs, 10 U.S. (7 Pet.) 554 (1833) ; Gallager v.
Marketstreet Ry. Co., 67 Cal. 13, 6 P. 869 (1885).
27. Bixby v. Omaha & C. B. Ry. & Bridge Co., 105 Iowa 293, 75 N.W. 182
(1898); Piotrowski v. Corey Hosp., 172 Ohio St. 61, 176 N.E.2d 355 (1961); Bowles
v. Bourdon, 148 Tex. 1, 219 S.W.2d 779 (1949).
28. The determination of admissibility of any text or treatise is made after
consideration of the need for its use and the trustworthiness the source affords. A more
thorough discussion of these two requisites follows. See notes 74-90 infra and
accompanying text.
29. Creaghe v. Iowa Home Mut. Cas. Co., 323 F.2d 981 (10th Cir. 1963);
Carantzas v. Iowa Home Mut. Ins. Co., 235 F.2d 193 (5th Cir. 1956); Downie v.
United States Lines Co., 231 F. Supp. 192 (E.D. Pa. 1964); Am-Cal Invest. Co. v.
Sharlyn Estates, Inc., 255 Cal. App. 2d 526, 63 Cal. Rptr. 518 (1967); Dussault v.
Condon, 170 Cal. App. 2d 693, 339 P.2d 896 (1959); Gass v. Carducci, 37 Ill. App.
2d 181, 185 N.E.2d 285 (1962); Wilson v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 272 N.C.
138, 158 S.E.2d 1 (1967); Potter v. Baker, 164 Ohio St. 488, 124 N.E.2d 140
(1955).
30. Farmer's Union Fed. Co-op. Ship. Ass'n. v. McChesney, 251 F.2d 441
(8th Cir. 1958); Scarano v. Schnoor, 158 Cal. App. 2d 612, 323 P.2d 178 (1958);
Rice v. Clement, 184 So. 2d 678, 680 (Fla. App. 1966); Crowley v. Elgin, Joliet &
E. Ry. Co., 1 Ill. App. 2d 481, 117 N.E.2d 843 (1954); Godthwaite v. Sheraton
Restaurant, 154 Me. 214, 145 A.2d 362 (1952) ; McComish v. DeSoi, 83 N.J. Super.
505, 200 A.2d 511 (1963); Texas Employer's Ins. Ass'n. v. Nixon, 328 S.W.2d
809 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959).
31. Wall v. Weaver, 145 Colo. 337, 358 P.2d 1009 (1961); Drucker v. Philadelphia Dairy Prod. Co., 35 Del. 437, 166 A. 796 (1933).
32. There has been some indication that this rule may be extended. Therefore,
although the witness had not referred to any specific authority, it could be assumed
from the nature of his testimony that he had relied somewhat on his study of texts.
See Reilly v. Pinkus, 338 U.S. 269 (1949).
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be invoked with the proviso that the authority is otherwise established.""
Finally, the most comprehensive conception contemplates use on crossexamination of any text the witness recognizes as authoritative, whether
or not he purports to base his opinion upon it. 4 This concluding view
has been altered 5 in a number of jurisdictions to allow the authority of
the work to be established by means other than the witness' recognition,
e.g., by other expert testimony or judicial notice. 6
Statutory Alteration of the Common Law
Fourteen jurisdictions have to date enacted statutes in attempted
modification of the common law standard. Eight are of general scope"
purporting to admit treatises88 as "primary, '"" "prima facie"" or "presumptive"'" evidence of "facts of general notoriety and interest." ' By
33. Farmer's Union Fed. Co-op. Ship. Ass'n. v. McChesney, 251 F.2d 441
(8th Cir. 1958) ; Gluckstein v. Lipsett, 93 Cal. App. 391, 209 P.2d 98 (1949) ; Morton
v. Equitable Life Ins. Co., 218 Iowa 846, 254 N.W. 325 (1934) ; McComish v. DeSoi, 83 N.J. Super. 505, 200 A.2d 511 (1963); Godthwaite v. Sheraton Restaurant,
154 Me. 362, 145 A.2d 362 (1952) ; Texas Employer's Ins. Ass'n. v. Nixon, 328 S.W.2d
809 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959).
34. Stottlemire v. Cawood, 215 F. Supp. 266 (D.D.C. 1963); Myers v. St.
Francis Hosp., 91 N.J. Super. 377, 220 A.2d 693 (1966); McComish v. DeSoi, 42
N.J. 274, 200 A.2d 116 (1964) ; Gravis v. Physicians & Surgeons Hosp. of Alice,
415 S.W.2d 674 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967).
35. Reilly v. Pinkus, 338 U.S. 269 (1949); Darling v. Charleston Comm.
Mem. Hosp., 33 Ill. 2d 326, 211 N.E.2d 243 (1965); Dabroe v. Rhodes Co., 64 Wash.
2d 431, 392 P.2d 317 (1964). Contra, Myers v. St. Francis Hosp., 91 N.J. Super.
377, 220 A. 2d 693 (1966) ; Hastings v. Chrysler Corp., 273 App. Div. 292, 77 N.Y.S.2d
(1948).
36. This more liberal view is allegedly accepted and implemented in the FED.
R. EvIn., 46 F.R.D. 161, 372 (Prelim. Draft 1969).
37. Seven jurisdictions, Alabama, Idaho, Iowa, Nebraska, Montana, Oregon and
Utah have accepted a general statute which reads:
Historical works, books of science or art, and published maps or charts,
made by persons indifferent between the parties are prima facie [primary
or presumptive] evidence of facts of general notoriety and interest.
See notes 39-41 infra and accompanying text. Cf. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1341 (West 1965).
38. There is indication that journals and pamphlets may not come within the
rule in some jurisdictions. Wiggins v. State, 39 Ala. App. 433, 104 So. 2d 560 (1958).
Contra, Julien v. Barbien, 75 Idaho 415, 272 P.2d 718 (1954).
39. ORE. REV. STAT. § 41.670 (1965). For case material discussing this statute
see Eckleberry v. Kaiser Found. N. Hosp., 226 Ore. 616, 359 P.2d 1090 (1948).
40. ALA. CODE tit. 7, § 413 (1958); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 9-402 (1948);
MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 93-1101-8 (1947); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-25-6 (1953).
For case material considering these statutes see City of Dothan v. Hardy, 237 Ala.
603, 188 So. 2d 264 (1939) ; Julien v. Barbien, 75 Idaho 415, 272 P.2d 718 (1954).
41. IowA CODE ANN. § 622.23 (1950) ; NE. REV. STAT. § 25-1218 (1943). For
mention of these statutes see Austin v. Whitaker, 135 Iowa 737, 110 N.W. 910 (1907)
Bixby v. Omaha & C. B. Ry. & Bridge Co., 105 Iowa 293, 75 N.W. 182 (1898).
42. Cf. CAL. EvID. CODE § 1341 (West 1965) which reads:
Historical works, books of science or art and published maps or charts
made by persons indifferent between the parties are not made inadmissible
by the hearsay rule when offered to prove facts of general notoriety and interest.
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the inclusion of the terminal phrase "facts of general notoriety and
interest," books of inexact science and implicitly, if not explicitly, books
of history or art of living authors are held inadmissible.4" The court
in Gallager v. Marketstreet Railway Co." poses the question,
[w]hat are 'facts of general notoriety and interest?' We think
the term stands for facts of a public nature, either at home or
abroad, not existing in the memory of men as contradistinguished from facts of a private nature existing within
the knowledge of living men, and as to which they may be
examined as witnesses. It is of such public facts, including
historical facts, facts of exact sciences, and of literature or art,
when relevant to a cause, that, under the provisions of the
Code [California Statute], proof may be made by the production of books of standard authority. So Mr. Justice Story,
in Morris v. Lessees of Harmer's Heirs, 7 Pet. 558, speaking
upon this subject, says:
'Historical facts of general and public notoriety may be
proven by reputation, and that reputation may be established
by historical works of known character and accuracy. But
evidence of this sort is confined in a great measure to ancient
facts which do not presuppose better in existence; and where,
from the nature of the transaction, or, the remoteness of the
period, or the public and general reception of the facts, a just
foundation is laid for general confidence. But the work of a
living author, who is within the reach of 4 the
process of the
5
court, can hardly, be deemed of this nature.'
Thus, it has been asserted that these statutes effect no material alteration
of the Common Law. 8
Three other jurisdictions have statutes of more limited scope,
restricting application to specified types of cases. Massachusetts 7 and
Id. (emphasis added). For judicial mention of this statute, see Gluckstein v. Lipsett,

93 Cal. App. 391, 209 P.2d 98 (1949).
43. Rautbord v. Ehmann, 190 F.2d 533 (7th Cir. 1951); Bixby v. Omaha & C. B.
Ry. & Bridge Co., 105 Iowa 293, 75 N.W. 182 (1898); International F. & A. M.
Masons v. Most Worshipful Prince Hall Grand Lodge, F. & A. M. Masons,
318 S.W.2d 46 (Ky. 1958); Eckleberry v. Kaiser Found. N. Hosp., 226 Ore. 616,
359 P.2d 1090 (1961).
44. 67 Cal. 13, 15, 6 P. 869, 871 (1885).
45. Id. at 15, 6 P. at 871.
46. 66 MIcH. L. REv. 183, 184 (1967).
47. MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 233, § 79C (1949)
Statements of facts or opinions on a subject of science or art contained in a
published treatise, periodical, book or pamphlet shall, in so far as the court
shall find that the said statements are relevant and that the writer of such
statements is recognized in his profession or calling as an expert on the subject,
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Nevada," recognizing the difficulty of securing medical testimony in
malpractice suits, 9 allow the use of medical texts in this instance at the
discretion of the court.5" There has been, however, some indication of
judicial reluctance to accept medical texts as authoritative under these
statutes.51 South Carolina allows books of medicine and science to be
utilized as independent evidence in proceedings in which the question of
sanity is presented.52 A careful reading of the statute, however, demonstrates that such use is acceptable only in addition to such expert testibe admissible in actions of contract or tort for malpractice, error or mistake
against physicians, surgeons, dentists, optometrists, hospitals and sanitaria, as
evidence tending to prove said facts or as opinion evidence; provided, however,
that the party intending to offer as evidence any such statements shall,
not less than thirty days before the trial of the action, give the adverse
party or his attorney notice of such intention, stating the name of the writer
of the statements, the title of the treatise, periodical, book or pamphlet in
which they are contained, the date of publication of the same, the name
of the publisher of the same, and whenever possible or practical the page
or pages of the same on which the said statements appear.
Id. For interpretation of the above statute see Ramsland v. Shaw, 341 Mass. 56,
166 N.E.2d 895 (1960); Reddington v. Claymore, 334 Mass. 244, 134 N.E.2d 920
(1956) ; Murawski v. Laird, 330 Mass. 549, 116 N.E.2d 279 (1953) ; Thomas v. Ellis,
329 Mass. 94, 106 N.E.2d 690 (1952).
48. NEv. REv. STAT. § 51.040 (1969). The statute reads:
Opinion evidence of experts admissible in malpractice actions; notice of
intention to offer.
1. A statement of fact or opinion on a subject of science or art contained in
a published treatise, periodical, book or pamphlet shall, in the discretion of
the court, and if the court finds that it is relevant and that the writer of
such statement is recognized in his profession or calling as an expert on
the subject, be admissible in actions of contract or tort for malpractice,
error or mistake against physicians, surgeons, dentists, optometrists, osteopathic
physicians or surgeons, chiropractors, podiatrists, naturopathic physicians,
hospitals and sanitaria, as evidence tending to prove the fact or as opinion
evidence.
2. The party intending to offer as evidence any such statement shall, not less
than three days before the trial of the action, give the adverse party notice
of such intention, stating the name of the writer of the statement and the
title of the treatise, peroidical, book or pamphlet in which it is contained.
Id. See Foreman v. Ver Bruggen, 81 Nev. 87, 398 P.2d 994 (1965), for construction
of this statute.
49. "It is a well-accepted fact that it is very difficult to secure members of the
medical profession to testify against colleagues in malpractice actions." Halldin v. Peterson, 29 Wis. 2d 668, 671, 159 N.W.2d 738, 741 (1968).
50. Case material has also suggested that notice be required in order to facilitate
pretrial discovery. Myers v. St. Francis Hosp., 91 N.J. Super. 377, 220 A.2d 693 (1966).
51. Ramsland v. Shaw, 341 Mass. 56, 166 N.E.2d 894 (1960); Reddington v.
Claymore, 334 Mass. 244, 134 N.E.2d 920 (1956).
52. S. C. CoDE ANN. § 26-142 (1962):
In all actions are proceedings, civil or criminal, in which the question of sanity or
insanity or the administration of poison or any other article destructive to life is
involved and in which expert testimony may be introduced, medical or scientific
works, or such parts thereof as may be relevant to the issues involved, shall be
competent and admissible to be read before the court or jury, in addition to such
expert testimony.
Id. (emphasis added).

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1970

1970]

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 5, No. 1 [1970], Art. 8
FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE

mony as may be introduced. Furthermore, case material applying the
statute indicates that it is limited solely to the genre of cases specified.5 8
Finally, three jurisdictions" have enacted the Uniform Rules of

Evidence provision.55 These enactments, however, have not undergone
significant judicial scrutiny." Although potentially revolutionary, they
have accomplished little in practical alteration of the common law
standard.5"
THE PROPOSED RULE

8-03(b) (18)"5

The Federal Rules of Evidence, as previously stated, adopt the
generic proposition that hearsay is inadmissible.5 9 Rule 8-02 provides:
Hearsay 0 is inadmissible except as provided by these rules
53. Baker v. Southern Cotton Oil Co., 161 S.C. 479, 159 S.E. 822 (1931)
Edwards v. Union Buffalo Mills Co., 162 S.C. 17, 159 S.E. 818 (1931).
54. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-460 (cc) (1964) ; C. Z. CODE tit. 5, § 2962(31) (1963)
VIRGIN ISLANDS CODE tit. 5, § 932(31) (1957). Accord, N.J. SuP. CT. RULES § 63(31)
(1965).
55. A published treatise or periodical, or pamphlet on a subject of history,
science or art [is admissible] to prove the truth of the matter stated therein
if the judge takes judicial notice or a witness expert in the subject testifies
that the treatise, periodical or pamphlet is a reliable authority in the subject.
UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE 63 (31).
56. City of Wichita v. Unified School Dist. No. 259, 201 Kan. 121, 439 P.2d

163 (1968).
57. Each of these statutes has been in force for a substantial duration, however,
none has received a significant amount of use. Therefore, although they may provide
latent changes in the Common Law, to date, there has been no apparent alteration.
58. FED. R. EVID., 46 F.R.D. 161, 349 (Prelim. Draft 1969).
59. Id. at 343.
60. FED. R. EVID. 8-02(c), 46 F.R.D. 161, 331 (Prelim. Draft 1969):
Hearsay. "Hearsay" is a statement, offered in evidence to prove the truth of
the matter asserted, unless
(1)
Testimony at Hearing. The statement is one made by a witness while
testifying at the trial or hearing; or
(2) Prior Statement by Witness. The declarant testifies at the trial or hearing
and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement, and the statement
is (i) inconsistent with his testimony, or (ii) consistent with his testimony
and is offered to rebut an express or implied charge against him of recent
fabrication or improper influence or motive, or (iii) one of identification of a
person made soon after perceiving him, or (iv) a transcript of testimony
given under oath at a trial or hearing or before a grand jury; or
(3) Admission by Party Opponent. The statement is offered against a party
and is (i) his own statement, in either his individual or representative
capacity, or (ii) a statement of which he has manifested his adoption or
belief in its truth, or (iii) a statement by a person authorized by him to
make a statement concerning the subject, or (iv) a statement by his agent
or servant concerning a matter within the scope of his agency or employment
or (v) a statement by a co-conspirator of a party during the course and in
furtherance of the conspiracy.
Id. at 331. Cf. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 225 (1954) [hereinafter cited as MCCORMICK];
Booker & Norton, The Hearsay Rule, The St. George Plays and the Road to the
Year Twenty-Fifty, 44 NOTRE DAME LAw. 7, 14-21 (1968). See also Am-Cal Invest.
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or by the Rules of Civil and Criminal Procedure or by Act
of Congress.61
There are two categorical provisions in exception to this generality:
first, Rule 8-03 "2 where the "Availability of Declarant " [is] Immaterial;" and second, Rule 8-04"4 limited to where the "Declarant
[is] Unavailable." 5 This note is directed to the former which states:
A statement" is not excluded by the hearsay rule if its nature
and the special circumstances under which it was made offer
assurances of accuracy not likely to be enhanced by calling the
declarant as a witness, even though he is available. "7
This rule is allegedly a synthesis of the exception developed by the
Common Law in which the unavailability of the declarant is not a
relevant factor.6 " It is thought that the present rule proceeds upon the
theory that under appropriate circumstances a hearsay statement may
be as good as testimony given by the declarant in person; thus, his
production is not required. 9
The learned treatise example is to be by way of illustration of the
above rule only and not by way of limitation."0 In this way the drafting
committee intended to furnish only a guide to appropriate application
while simultaneously enabling growth and development in the law of
Co. v. Sharlyn Estates, Inc., 255 Cal. App. 2d 526, 63 Cal. Rptr. 518 (1967) ; Wilson
v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 272 N.C. 138, 158 S.E.2d 1 (1967).

61.

FED.

R. EVID. 8-02, 46 F.R.D. 161, 343 (Prelim. Draft 1969).

62. 1d. at 345-77.
63. FED. R. EVID. 8-01, 46 F.R.D. 161, 331 (Prelim. Draft 1969)

"Unavailable as a witness" includes situations in which the declarant is:
(1) Exempted by ruling of the judge on the ground of privilege

from

testifying concerning the subject matter of his statement; or
(2) Persistent in refusing to testify in spite of an order of the judge to do
so; or

(3) Unable to be present or to testify at the hearing because of death or then
existing physical or mental illness or infirmity; or
(4) Absence from the hearing and beyond the jurisdiction of the court to
compel appearance and the proponent of his statement has exercised reasonable
diligence but has been unable to procure his attendance.
A declarant is not unavailable as a witness if his exemption, refusal, inability,
or absence is due to the procurement or wrongdoing of the proponent of his
statement for the purpose of preventing the witness from attending or testifying.
64. Id. at 377-87.
65. Id. at 332.
66. FED. R. EvID. 8-01(a), 46 F.R.D. 161, 331 (Prelim. Draft 1969), states: "A
'statement' is (1) an oral or written assertion or (2) nonverbal conduct of a person, if
it is intended by him as an assertion." Id.
67. Id. 8-03(a) at 345.
68. Id. 8-03, Advisory Committee's Note at 351.
69. Id. at 350.
70. Id. 8-03(b) at 345.
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evidence. 7" Rule 8-03(b) (18)2 provides:
To the extent called to the attention of an expert witness upon
cross-examination or relied upon by him in direct examination,
statements contained in published treatises, periodicals, or
pamphlets on a subject of history, medicine, or other science
or art, established as reliable authority by the testimony or
admission of the witness or by other expert testimony or by
judicial notice [are allowed in evidence] .
As this note proceeds, it will attempt to demonstrate first, that
Rule 8-03 is not a synthesis of prior exceptions because it eliminates
the requirement of necessity heretofore imperative; secondly, that if it
can be conceded that there must exist necessity, the exception for learned
treatises only minimally demonstrates this quality; and thirdly, that
learned treatises do not provide the requisite complement of trustworthiness for an exception to the hearsay rule.
THE PRINCIPLES OF EXCEPTION AND RULE

8-03 (b) (18)

The theory of the hearsay rule is that an out of court statement
may be replete with inaccuracy and/or untrustworthiness which would
not be detected without being subjected to the test of crossexamination.7" The factors to be considered in evaluating testimony,
namely perception, memory, sincerity and, most important, narration,7"
might remain unobserved and untested. 8 Of course, in a given instance
the test of cross-examination may be either impossible to employ because
of the unavailability of the declarant,7 7 or superfluous because of the
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id. 8-03, Advisory Committee's Note at 351.
Id. 8-03(b) (18) at 349.
Id.
MCCORMICK § 224. See Buchanan v. Nye, 128 Cal. App. 2d 582, 275 P.2d

767 (1954), which states:
The basic theory [of hearsay] is that the many possible deficiencies, suppressions, sources of error and untrustworthiness, which lie underneath the
basic untested assertions of a witness, may be best brought to light by the

test of cross-examination.
Id. at 770.
75.

Morgan, Hearsay Dangers and the Application of the Hearsay Test, 62

HARv. L REv. 177 (1948), acknowledged in FED. R. Evm. Art. VIII, Introductory
Note, 46 F.R.D. 161, 324 (Prelim. Draft 1969). See United States v. National Homes
Corp., 196 F. Supp. 370 (N.D. Ind. 1961).

76. Eckleberry v. Kaiser Found. N. Hosp., 226 Ore. 616, 359 P.2d 1090 (1961).
77. The principle of necessity has been found to be satisfied upon the showing of:
(1) the unavailability of the declarant; (2) an inconvenience caused the courts in
requiring the declarant's attendance; or (3) that the hearsay statement may be
better than one which could be obtained were the declarant to take the stand.
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obvious accuracy of the statement."8 In such a case, an exception to the
hearsay rule may be well-founded." Of these two criteria, the first,
unavailability, must be considered under the principle of necessity, and
the second, inaccuracy, under the principle of trustworthiness. The two
principles in combination serve as requisites for exception to the
hearsay rule. 0 As summarized by the court in Zippo Manufacturing
Co. v. Rogers :8

[A] determination that a statement is hearsay does not end
the inquiry into admissibility; there must still be a further
examination of the need for the statement at trial and the
circumstantial guaranty of trustworthiness surrounding the
making of the statement.82
The Proposed Rules purport to recognize the application of
necessity and trustworthiness in forming exceptions to the hearsay rule. 8
While the federal courts have been particularly liberal in looking to
these principles, 4 it is submitted that the theory of hearsay as proposed
by Rule 8 is too simplistic. To illustrate: if the declarant is available,
Rule 8-03 dictates that the evidence is admissible if its quality is considered to be at least as good as that which would be forthcoming had
78. 5 WIGMORE § 1420. See also Nordstrom v. White Metal Rolling & Stamping
Corp., 75 Wash. 2d 644, 453 P.2d 619 (1969).
79. Bailey v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 115 S.W.2d 151 (Mo. App. 1938);
Southern Underwriters v. Boswell, 141 S.W.2d 442 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940), a!f'd,
138 Tex. 255, 158 S.W.2d 280 (1942).
80. G. & C. Merriam Co. v. Syndicate Pub. Co., 207 F. 515 (2d Cir. 1913);
Edsall v. Rockland Paper Co., 38 Del. 495, 194 A. 115 (1937) ; Whittaker v. Thornberry, 206 Ky. 830, 209 S.W.2d 498 (1948); Smith v. State, 49 Misc. 2d 985, 268
N.Y.S.2d 873 (Sup. Ct. 1966) ; Potter v. Baker, 162 Ohio St. 488, 124 N.E.2d 140 (1955) ;
Southern Underwriters v. Boswell, 141 S.W.2d 442 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940), aff'd, 138
Tex. 255, 158 S.W.2d 280 (1942); Nordstrom v. White Metal Rolling & Stamping
Corp., 75 Wash. 2d 644, 453 P.2d 619 (1969). But see Pope v. United States, 296
F. Supp. 17 (S.D. Cal. 1968), where the court stated: "[T]he key requirement for the
admission of a hearsay statement as an exception to the hearsay rule is trustworthiness."
Id. at 20. See also Mikula v. Balogh, 9 Ohio App. 2d 250, 224 N.E.2d 148 (1965), in
which the court said, "[e]xceptions to the hearsay rule are found in cases of necessity
or where the reliability of the evidence is established." Id. at 253, 224 N.E.2d at 151.
However, an exception based on necessity or public policy was recognized in
Jendresak v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 330 Ill. App. 157, 70 N.E.2d 863 (1947),
and Bailey v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 115 S.W.2d 151 (Mo. App. 1938). Finally, in
Moore v. Atlantic Transit Sys., Inc., 105 Ga. App. 70, 123 S.E.2d 693 (1961), hearsay
was admitted solely on the basis of necessity.
81. 216 F. Supp. 670 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
82. Id. at 683.
83. FED. R. EVID. 8-04, Advisory Committee's Note, 46 F.R.D. 161, 379 (Prelim.
Draft 1969).
84. Sabatina v. Curtiss Nat'l Bank, 415 F.2d 632 (5th Cir. 1969) ; United States
v. 60.14 Acres of Land, 362 F.2d 660 (3d Cir. 1966); Dallas County v. Commercial
Union Assur. Co., 286 F.2d 388 (5th Cir. 1961).
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the declarant taken the stand. This proposition, however, ignores the
significance of prior exceptions which were predicated upon the necessity
of receiving a statement only when it is better than one which could be
obtained were the declarant to take the stand. 5 To accept the test as
proposed by Rule 8-03 is to reject any requirement of necessity
and to relegate the burden for exception solely to the guarantee of
trustworthiness. If Rule 8-03 were to require the hearsay statement to be
better than one which could be obtained were the declarant to take the
stand, then the principle of necessity would be fulfilled.
The principles of necessity and trustworthiness are not exclusive
but are intended to mutually supplement one another.8 6 Where one is
weak, the other may compensate and still provide exception. Recognition
of this dichotomy is clearly demonstrated by Rule 8-04. s ' If there is a
showing of necessity by demonstrating the unavailability of the declarant,
the evidence is admissible assuming it also offers strong assurances of
accuracy. The Committee appears to have equated the unavailabilityavailability determination with that of necessity. Once the declarant is
determined to be either available or unavailable under the Rules, the
search for necessity ceases and the test of accuracy is applied. This
interpretation is a misconception or an alteration in derogation of the
common law principle. It is submitted that a determination of availability
is not synonymous with nor should it foreclose the inquiry into
necessity."8 Trustworthiness alone has not sufficed to allow exception"
-some degree of necessity has been required. Rule 8-03 is not, therefore, a synthesis of common law exceptions because it deletes the major
principle of necessity."0
85. Hamilton v. Huebner, 146 Neb. 320, 19 N.W.2d 552 (1945); In re Roeder's
Estate, 44 N.M. 429, 103 P.2d 631 (1940).
86. 5 WIGM OR § 1420; Wickes, Ancient Documents and Hearsay, 8 TEXAS L.
REv.450 (1930).
87. FED. R. EVID. 8-04, 46 F.R.D. 161, 377-88 (Prelim. Draft 1969).
88. Jendresak v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 330 Ill. App. 157, 70 N.E.2d 863
(1947).
89. Dallas County v. Commercial Union Assur. Co., 286 F.2d 388 (5th Cir.
1961); G. & C. Merriam Co. v. Syndicate Pub. Co., 207 F. 515 (2d Cir. 1913).
90. The Proposed Rules may be an attempt to eliminate the principle of necessity
as historically defined. This may be done legislatively as long as there is no concurrent
infringement of constitutional rights. Of main concern in view of this possibility is
the right to confrontation in criminal trials.
The main policy underlying the hearsay rule is to protect the right of the
party against whom the statement is being offered by giving him the opportunity
to confront the person making the statement.
United States v. National Homes Corp., 196 F. Supp. 370, 372 (N.D. Ind. 1961).
See also Colorificio Italiano Max Meyer S.P.A. v. S.S. Hellenic Wave, 419 F.2d
223 (5th Cir. 1969).
The Common Law generally recognized two exceptions to the rule of confronta-
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SURVEY OF THE PRINCIPLE OF NECESSITY

The first of the common law requisites for exception to the hearsay
rule is necessity. The import of this desideratum is that unless certain
hearsay statements are admitted, the facts they tend to establish may be
lost to the tribunal.9 As the law has developed, however, it has not
always demanded a showing of total inaccessibility as a condition precedent to admission of such evidence.9" "[I]f it were otherwise the
result would be that the exception to the hearsay rule would thereby be
mostly if not completely destroyed."99
The narrowest interpretation ever applied for exception to the
hearsay rule is total inaccessibility to any competent evidence, i.e., the
declarant is unavailable and there is no other evidence available from
any source." This position was adopted in a number of the early cases
which considered dying declarations.9 5
Evidence of this sort [dying declarations] is admissible in
this case on the fullest necessity; for it often happens that there
is no third person present to be eyewitness to the fact; and the
usual witness on occasion of other felonies, namely, the party
tion: 1) dying declarations, and 2) testimony given at a former trial. Kirby v. United
States, 174 U.S. 47 (1899) ; Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1895).
The enactment of the Constitution allegedly secured rights already possessed under
the Common Law, but what were these rights? Some felt that only the two exceptions
already existing to confrontation should be allowed. Others felt that new concessions
could be made and it was only the criteria for exception that were established by the
Constitution. Motes v. United States, 178 U.S. 458 (1900); Reynolds v. United
States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878); Orcutt v. State, -Iowa-, 173 N.W.2d 66 (1969). In all
exceptions to the rule, however, the requirement of necessity was recognized. Mattox
v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1895). Traditional exceptions to the rule have been
made when the witness was shown to be unavailable. West v. Louisiana, 194 U.S.
258 (1904). Recently, however, this criteria has Seen strictly construed to demand a
showing that not only is the witness unavailable but also that an attempt has been made
to obtain his presence. Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968). In the light of recent
decisions, it does not appear likely that an exception for learned treatises would be
consistent or within the spirit of the current interpretation of the constitutional
guarantee; therefore, the exception must ultimately be found inapplicable to criminal
adjudication. Cf. FED. R. EVID. Art. VIII, Confrontation and Due Process, 46 F.R.D.
161, 328-31 (Prelim. Draft 1969).
91. Jendresak v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 330 Ill. App. 157, 70 N.E.2d 863
(1947) ; In re Roeder's Estate, 44 N.M. 429, 103 P.2d 631 (1940) ; 5 WIGMORE § 1421.
92. In re Roeder's Estate, 44 N.M. 429, 103 P.2d 631 (1940).
93. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 35 F. Supp. 820, 823 (S.D.N.Y.
1940).
94. "The law has therefore wisely rejected all hearsay evidence excepting where it
is impossible in the nature of things to obtain any other ... " SwiFT, EVIDENCE, § 121
(1810). See 5 WIGMORE §§ 1420, 1431.
95. Ellicott v. Pearl, 12 U.S. (10 Pet.) 412 (1836) ; Fulkerson v. Holmes, 117
U.S. 389 (1886); Landers v. Hayes, 196 Ala. 533, 72 So. 106 (1916). See 5
W GmORE § 1481.
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injured himself is gotten rid of."8
Although the strict application to dying declarations has been labeled a
misconception of the law,"7 the position has been reasserted in cases of
general reputation. 8 The court in Davis' Administration v. Chasteen"
stated:
Evidence of this character is admitted because it is the best
obtainable under the circumstances, and greater evils result from
the rejection of such proof than from its admission."'
The majority of the courts and text writers have held it sufficient
under the hearsay rule that only the declarant be unavailable.' They
would admit his out of court statement where it demonstrates the
requisite trustworthiness even if other and adequate testimony is
available. Availability has turned on a variety of different issues including
death,' insanity," 3 absence from the jurisdiction0 4 and privilege.' Rule
8-04 would appear to be the counterpart of this view.'
Even where the witness is available,
not been foreclosed under Common Law.
exceptions result from further recognition
exception is allowed where the statement

the inquiry into necessity has
In such a case the recognized
of one of two qualities. First,
of hearsay is of better quality

96. Pleas of the Crown I, 353 (1803), cited in 5 WIGMORE § 1431.
97. 5 WIGMORE § 1432.
98. Landers v. Hayes, 196 Ala. 533, 72 So. 106 (1916); State v. Schaller, 111
Ind. App. 128, 40 N.E.2d 976 (1942) (family reputation); Piper v. Voorhees, 130
Me. 305, 155 A. 556 (1931) (general reputation). See also S WIGMORE §§ 1481,
1582; MCCORMICK §§ 297, 299.
99. 273 S.W.2d 368 (Ky. 1954).
100. Id. at 369.
101. This view would include the more liberal interpretation applied to dying
declarations. See 5 WIGMoRE § 1436.
102. Stein v. Bowman, 13 U.S. (13 Pet.) 209 (1839); Jarchow v. Jrosse, 257
I1. 36, 100 N.E. 290 (1912); Ellis v. Dixon, 294 Ky. 609, 172 S.W.2d 461 (1943);
Piper v. Voorhees, 130 Me. 305, 155 A. 556 (1931); Osborne v. Purdome, 250 S.W.2d
159 (Mo. 1952).
103. McCoy v. State, 221 Ala. 466, 129 So. 21 (1930) ; Weber v. Chicago, R. I. &
P. R. Co., 175 Iowa 358, 151 N.W. 852 (1915).
104. Alabama Power Co. v. Ray, 249 Ala. 568, 32 So. 2d 219 (1947) ; Wolski v.
National Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 135 Neb. 643, 283 N.W. 381 (1939); Norton v. State,
148 Tex. Crim. 249, 186 S.W.2d 347 (1945).
105. Wyatt v. State, 35 Ala. App. 147, 46 So. 2d 837 (1950); McCoy v. State,
221 Ala. 466, 129 So. 21 (1930); Woodward v. State, 21 Ala. App. 417, 109 So. 119
(1926) ; State v. Reidie, 142 Kan. 290, 46 P2d 601 (1935) ; State v. Stewart, 85 Kan.
404, 116 P. 489 (1911).
See FED. R. EVID. 8-01, Advisory Committee's Note, 46
F.R.D. 161, 342-43 (Prelim. Draft 1969).
106. For a discussion of Rule 8-04, see Note, Rule 8-o4(b) (2) of the Proposed
Federal Rules ol Esidence: A Step Too Far!, 4 VAL. U.L. REv. 327 (1970).
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than could be expected if the witness were to take the stand. 0' 7 Statements of mental or physical condition.0 . and spontaneous exclamations'
are two examples of such exceptions. In summary of this proposition
Justice Holmes stated in Elmer v. Fessenden:110
[S]uch declarations [a statement of mental condition]
made with no apparent motive for misstatement may be better
evidence of the maker's state of mind at the time than the
subsequent testimony of the same person.'
The second and alternative quality depends on the practical inconvenience of requiring the declarant's attendance. Such considerations
have provided for use of official statements," 2 standard pricelists,""8
market and trade reports,"' law reports,'1 5 surveys,"' safety codes1"'
and various commercial and professional registers."' The rationali offered
in support of these admissions are: first, were there no exception for
official statements, public servants would be found devoting the greater
part of their time as witnesses with the result that the administration of
107. Montana Power Co. v. F.P.C., 185 F.2d 491 (D.C. Cir. 1950); In re
Roeder's Estate, 44 N.M. 429, 103 P.2d 631 (1940) ; 5 WIGMORE § 1421.
108. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hillman, 145 U.S. 285 (1892) ; Meaney v. United
States, 112 F.2d 538 (2d Cir. 1940); Valentine v. Weaver, 191 Ky. 37, 228 S.W.
1036 (1921); Bacon v. The Inhabitants of Charleton. 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 581 (1851).
See 6 WIGMORE § 1714.
109. United States v. Edmonds, 63 F. Supp. 968 (D.D.C. 1946); Showalter v.
Western Pac. R. Co., 16 Cal. 2d 460, 106 P. 2d 895 (1940) ; Jacobs v. Village of Buhl,
199 Minn. 572, 273 N.W. 245 (1937) ; Hamilton v. Huebner, 146 Neb. 320, 19 N.W.2d

552 (1945) ; Simprini v. Boston & M. R.R., 87 N.H. 279, 179 A. 349 (1935).
110. 151 Mass. 359, 24 N.E. 208 (1889).
111. Id. at 359, 24 N.E. at 208.
112. 5 WIGMORE § 1631.
113. Tallant v. Hamilton, 406 S.W.2d 599 (Mo. 1966).
114. Robey v. Sun Record Co., 242 F.2d 684 (5th Cir. 1957) ; General Electric Employees Sec. Corp. v. Manning, 173 F.2d 637 (3d Cir. 1943) ; Mohr v. Schultz, 861 Idaho
531, 388 P.2d 1002 (1964); Baker v. Atkins, 258 S.W.2d 16 (Mo. 1953); California
Sugar & Whitepine Co. v. Whitman Jackson & Co., 33 N.M. 117, 263 P. 504 (1928);
McMillan Feeds, Inc. v. Harlow, 405 S.W.2d 123 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966); Houston
Packing Co. v. Spivey, 333 S.W. 2d 423 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960).
115. Mackay v. Easton, 87 U.S. (19 Wall.) 632 (1873); Moumdjis v. S.S.
The Ionian Trader, 157 F. Supp. 319 (E.D. Va. 1957); Baggett v. Davis, 124 Fla. 701,
169 So. 372 (1936); Garza v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 418 S.W.2d 595 (Tex. Civ. App.
1967).
116. United States v. National Homes Corp., 196 F. Supp. 370 (N.D. Ind. 1961)
Girl Scouts of U.S.A. v. Hollingsworth, 188 F. Supp. 707 (E.D.N.Y. 1960); Smith v.
State, 49 Misc. 2d 985, 268 N.Y.S.2d 873 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
117. Bergeron v. Hetherwick, 140 So. 2d 440 (La. 1962); Catholic Diocese of
Natchez-Jackson v. Joquith, 224 So. 2d 216 (Miss. 1960). Contra, Guidry v. Grain
Dealers Mut. Ins. Co., 193 So. 2d 873 (La. 1967); Breshears v. Myers, 226 S.W.2d
638 (Mo. 1954) ; Smith v. Hardy, 228 S.C. 112, 88 S.E.2d 865 (1955).
118. Baker v. Atkins, 258 S.W.2d 16 (Mo. 1953).
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government and consequently, the public, would suffer greatly;11
secondly, the inaccessibility of authors in other jurisdictions and the inconvenience that would be caused the courts by the summoning of all the
individuals whose knowledge had gone into the final work would be
crippling ;120 and thirdly, that the written statement made contemporaneously with the official act would be of better quality than the official's
12
present testimony. '

A division of exceptions into declarant available and declarant
unavailable may be convenient; however, necessity is a broader concept
and includes the aforementioned two qualities as well as a determination
of whether the declarant is available or unavailable.
Necessity as Applied to Learned Treatises
If necessity has been omitted, but is deemed implicit in interpretation of Rule 8-03, one still must specifically demonstrate such precept
for learned treatises to justify their individual inclusion. The necessity
commonly advanced for learned treatises is that of inconvenience. The
possibilities of inconvenience are threefold: first, the general inaccessibility to experts ;121 secondly, the great expense for litigants to employ
such experts ;...and thirdly, the slowing of court procedures with resulting contribution to the docket crisis. 2 '
The concept of inaccessibility is founded on the assumption that
courts only admit expert evidence derived from personal observation but
reject evidence obtained by study and reading of textual materials."2 5
If this proposition is accepted, it follows that it may be difficult or
impossible to obtain locally a "qualified" expert. The necessity would
result from the great distance from which these experts must be summoned. There are two difficulties with this rationalization: first, the
initial assumption is fallacious since courts generally do not reject
expert testimony based on study;2' and secondly, if, in fact, it is im119.
120.

5 WIGMORE § 1631; 6 WIGMORE § 1702.
5 WIGMORE § 1631; 6 WIGMoRE § 1702.
121. MCoRmicic § 291.
122. 6 WIGMORE § 1691; 66 MIcH. L. R.Ev.

183 (1967);

2 U.C.L.A.L. REV.

252 (1955).
123.

6 WIGMOR

§ 1691; 66 MICH. L. Rv. 183 (1967); 12 S. CAL. L. Ry. 424

(1939).
124. Smith, The Hearsay Rule and the Docket Crisis: The Futile Search for
Paradise,54 A.B.A.J. 231 (1968).
125. Soquet v. State, 72 Wis. 659, 40 N.W. 391 (1888).
126. Hope v. Arrowhead & Puritas Waters, 174 Cal. App. 2d 222, 344 P.2d
428 (1959); Godthwaite v. Sheraton Restaurant, 154 Me. 214, 145 A.2d 362 (1952);
Town of Framingham v. Department of Pub. Util., 355 Mass. 138, 244 N.E.2d 281

(1969).
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possible to obtain a "qualified" expert within the jurisdiction, the
necessity involved would no longer be one of convenience but rather one
of unavailability."" Furthermore, this unavailability would be of the
highest degree, being not only that of the declarant, but also of any
other competent, substitute evidence. If such were the case, Rule 8-04
may be applicable to allow possible exception.
Unavailability may arise not only by the lack of "qualified" experts
within the jurisdiction but also when they are present but unwilling to
testify. 2 ' Massachusetts and Nevada have recognized the unavailability
problem in malpractice cases and accordingly have provided a statute
directed solely toward resolving the situation. 2 It would appear that this
more limited approach may be more sensible than providing for unlimited
use of treatises.
One could argue on the basis of unavailability that, as in dying
declarations, it is not the unavailability of testimony, but the unavailability of the declarant, that should be of concern. 8 ' If this were accepted,
one could choose a text written by an absent but sympathetic author,
prove his unavailability, and subsequently introduce his work into
evidence. This hypothetical should point out the difficulty in applying
this singular test of necessity to learned treatises. The nature of the
evidence itself provides a larger source from which a variety of views
could be extracted. Therefore, the range of choice in obtaining expert
evidence is much wider than can be found in the other exceptions for
unavailability, e.g., dying declarations. Expert opinion of this nature is
not restricted by personal knowledge of the particular case in which it
would be introduced, but it is formed in consideration of extrinsic
materials which may be beyond the scope of the inquiry. This evidence
should not, therefore, be utilized if other competent testimony is otherwise easily available. The fear of loss of a valuable source should not
prompt its admission when other equally qualified experts could be
called upon to testify. It is suggested that calling an expert to the stand
more effectively serves the court's quest for truth. A more rigorous
test should be demanded of the proponent of the learned treatise. Unlike
other forms of evidence, the treatise is more likely to receive extensive
use even when other testimonial evidence is available. This is a result
of other considerations such as the expense of substitute evidence.
Possibly, material of this sort should be excluded unless a pressing need
127. See notes 94-106 supra and accompanying text.
128. See note 49 supra.
129. See note 47 supra and accompanying text.
130. See notes 102-06 supra and accompanying text.
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for use of such evidence is clearly demonstrated, e.g., total inaccessibility
of any alternative. Where such a "pressing need" is present, Rule 8-04
rather than Rule 8-03 would be the appropriate instrument for exception.
The second objection is more difficult to answer for one cannot
easily ignore the continually rising expense of litigation.'
The mere
fact of expense, however, should not determine the admissibility of
hearsay. 8 This evidence may be instrumental in deciding the issues of
the case. The right of cross-examination' 8 should not be abrogated in
favor of the proponent's financial interest. Furthermore, Rule 8-03(b)
(18) requires attendance of an expert in order to introduce a treatise.'8 4
With the exception of those cases where an expert is either a summonable witness or a party to the suit, this rule would necessitate at least one
of the parties bearing the expense of an expert before either could make
use of any treatise. The expense of an expert witness is of small consequence when weighing the parties' rights and responsibilities under the
Federal Rules.
Finally, there has been some comment inferring that the hearsay
rule impedes the search for truth by contributing greatly to the congestion of the courts. 5 This may be a valid criticism of the rule generally
but should not be directed solely at learned treatises. It is burdensome
to reject any hearsay statement and require substitute evidence; however,
it is only where further difficulty is encountered in obtaining this
evidence that exception is justified.'
If one accepts the hearsay rule
generally, as does the Committee,"" he should not be heard to make
exception to the rule based on a characteristic common to all such
evidence. Furthermore, this argument loses some of its persuasive power
when considered in conjunction with Rule 8-03(b)(18). Since the
131. See note 122 supra and accompanying text.
132. Johns-Mansfield Prod. Corp. v. Cather, 208 Miss. 268, 44 So. 2d 405 (1950).
See Hamilton v. Huebner, 146 Neb. 320, 19 N.W.2d 552 (1945), which indicates that
hardship does not warrant exception, but the existence of a class of cases in which
hearsay is the only possible proof necessitates exception.
133. MCCORMICK § 19:
The Common Law judges and lawyers for two centuries have regarded the
opportunity of cross-examination as an essential safeguard of the accuracy
and completeness of testimony, and they have insisted that cross-examination
is a right and not a mere privilege.
Id. See also Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687 (1931).
134. The rule states: "To the extent called to the attention of an expert witness
upon cross-examination or relied upon by him in direct examination ..
" FED. R. EviD.
8-03(b) (18), 46 F.R.D. 161, 349 (Prelim. Draft 1969). See also Id. Advisory
Committee's Notes at 371.
135. See note 124 supra.
136. See notes 107-21 supra and accompanying text.
137. FED. R. EviD. Art. VIII, Introductory Note, 46 F.R.D. 161, 327-28 (Prelim.
Draft 1969).
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rule requires the attendance of an expert in order to introduce a text,
any judicial inconvenience which is likely to occur has in all probability
already come to pass. 8s
In final critique it has been stated that the foundation for exception
of learned treatises is that of inconvenience. When compared with that of
previously accepted exceptions, however, the inconvenience of admitting
learned treatises appears to be of different specie. In previous examples,
the inconvenience referred to was either that of the public or that of the
court." 9 Here, however, the inconvenience appears to lie with the litigant
and/or the author. Neither the expense nor the effort of summoning
authors is the responsibility of the court. Necessity in this instance is
of partisan interest and not grounded on obtaining the best evidence
available. It is submitted that the necessity can at best be minimal, and
exception, therefore, should be allowed only after a demonstration of a
high degree of trustworthiness.
TRUSTWORTHINESS

The principle of trustworthiness is considered to be a practical
substitute for the ordinary test of cross-examination. 4 ' When combined
with necessity, trustworthiness induces the courts to accept evidence
untested.' 4' There has not been a comprehensive attempt, to date, to
secure uniformity in the degree of trustworthiness which the circumstances for admitting hearsay presuppose.' 42 Accordingly, any attempt
to compare the trustworthiness of treatises with that of other exceptions
would be futile.'43 Wigmore, however, has suggested three circumstances
under which adequate testimony may be recognized :'.
[W]here the circumstances are such that a sincere and
accurate statement would naturally be uttered, and no plan of
falsification be formed; where even though a desire to falsify
might be present itself, other considerations, such as the chance
of easy detection or the fear of punishment, would probably
counteract its force; where the statement was made under such
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

See note 134 supra and accompanying text.
See notes 108-20 supra and accompanying text.
5 WIGMORE § 1422.
Id.
Id.
Hamilton v. Huebner, 146 Neb. 320, 19 N.W.2d 552 (1945). See also 5

WIGMOIE § 1422.

144. 5 WIGMORE § 1422. See also Dallas County v. Commercial Union Assur.
Co., 286 F.2d 388 (5th Cir. 1961); Nordstrom v. White Metal Rolling & Stamping
Corp., 75 Wash. 2d 644, 453 P.2d 619 (1969).
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conditions of publicity that an error if it had occurred would
probably have been detected and corrected."'
An exception for learned treatises might find support from the
first and third of the proposed tests. In satisfaction of the first test, it
has been asserted that such writings would naturally be sincere having
been written by non-partisan authors with no view toward litigation."
In many of the states' attempts at codification, this presumption was
made a statutory prerequisite to admissibility.1 7 In the Federal Rules
of Evidence, however, the assurance has not been included. It has been
assumed that this test will have been satisfied.'4 8 While the possibilities
of use of partisan or self-serving documents are few, the Committee's
intent might be better served by the inclusion of such a phrase.
The third test offers the most support for learned treatises. It has
frequently been asserted by proponents of admissibility that the author
writes for his profession and anticipates that his opinions will be subject
to the greatest scrutiny. Accordingly, if an author's conclusions are
discovered to be ill-founded, it is assumed that such statements will be
refuted.' This assumption is itself the foundation of possible objection
to the admission of learned treatises as independent evidence. If issue
is taken with an author's opinion or observation, can an inexperienced
jury be expected to resolve the controversy?1"' Many conflicting statements may be eliminated by the requirement of authority, but even the
authorities differ at times."' It is submitted that this assimilation of fact
and knowledge is far more difficult to resolve than mere opinion of fact
admissible under other exceptions.'
To relegate this duty to the jury is
to place an unreasonable burden upon men and women of limited
capabilities.
It is submitted that even if these two tests are satisfied, they would
145.

5 WIGMOm § 1422.

146. "Their statement is made with no view to a litigation or to the interests of a
litigable affair." 6 WIGMORE § 1692. But see Grubb, A Code of Evidence for Wisconsin?,
1946 Wis. L. REv. 81.
147.
148.
149.
150.
148 Tex.

See notes 36 and 42 supra and accompanying text.
See note 72 supra and accompanying text.
See note 146 supra and accompanying text.
Stottlemire v. Cawood, 215 F. Supp. 266 (D.D.C. 1963) ; Bowles v. Bourdon,
1, 219 S.W.2d 779 (1949) ; Grubb, A Code of Evidence for Wisconsin?,

1946 Wis. L Rxv. 81.
151. Van Striker v. Poter, 43 Mont. 317, 117 P. 81 (1911).
152. Opinion of fact requires no application of personal knowledge but calls
merely for personal observation. Opinion of fact and knowledge requires the application
of formally acquired knowledge, personal to the declarant or a class to which he
belongs, to the facts. The result is an opinion of fact tempered by the knowledge of the

author.
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remain inadequate to justify admission of learned treatises. They do not
bear directly on the objections to such evidence. Wigmore's classification
is intended to protect against insincerity, a propensity to falsify and poor
perception and memory, whereas the primary objection to the admission
of treatises is that of skepticism that the jury can comprehend and
effectively utilize the evidence without cross-examination. 5 ' Most
authorities neither question the integrity of the author nor infer
that the writer is likely to falsify; rather, they fear that isolated passages
from his opinions may not give a full and clear view of his thoughts...
or that the language may be too technical and beyond the understanding
of the average juror. 5" The material on this topic indicates that crossexamination is more than a mere opportunity to discover and uncover
insincerities; it is a tool to facilitate communication of the entire issue
to the jury' 56 If a book is allowed to speak when called forth by the
proponent, but remains immune from cross-examination, it is not possible
to qualify, impeach or explain its contents beyond its face.' If the same
testimony were elicited from an expert witness, it would be limited to
hypothetical questions qualified by the facts of the particular case.'""
There would exist an opportunity to explain the import of the text for
the benefit of the jury. The obvious narrative imbalance resulting from
use of treatises has been a determining factor in rendering this type of
evidence unacceptable. The trustworthiness has been deemed of too low a
quality to justify admission, at least in light of the necessity of receiving
the evidence.
The Proposed Rule
In striving to render treatises admissible, the Federal Rules of
Evidence have endeavored to rectify a number of the aforementioned
shortcomings. The Proposed Rules have attempted solution of the
dangers of misunderstanding or misapplication of the evidence by limiting the use of treatises to situations where an expert witness is on the
stand and available to explain the import of passages read into evidence. 5"
153. Stottlemire v. Cawood, 215 F. Supp. 266 (D.D.C. 1963) ; Bowles v. Bourdon,
148 Tex. 1, 219 S.W.2d 779 (1949).
154. Dana, Admission of Learned Treatises in Evidence, 1945 Wis. L. REV. 455.
155. Bowles v. Bourdon, 148 Tex. 1, 219 S.W.2d 779 (1949).
156. For an excellent discussion of the problems of communication in the court
room, see Korn, Law, Fact and Science in the Courts, 66 COLUM. L. Rv. 1080 (1966).
157. Koury v. Follo, 272 N.C. 366, 158 S.E.2d 548 (1968); Hallsworth v.
Republic Steel Corp., 153 Ohio 349, 91 N.E.2d 690 (1950) ; Eckleberry v. Kaiser Found.
N. Hosp., 226 Ore. 616, 359 P.2d 1090 (1961).
158. Koury v. FolIo, 272 N.C. 366, 158 S.E.2d 548 (1968).
159. See note 134 supra and accompanying text.
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This creates still additional difficulties. An article may be subject to
varying interpretations by different experts.16 The jury would have
the impossible task of resolving the issue. Furthermore, who is an expert
under the Federal Rules of Evidence? There appears to be no requirement that the witness be an expert in the field for which the text is
being offered, nor are there any criteria for expertise within any field.
If the statute is to be applied literally, a general medical practitioner or
a registered nurse could establish as reliable authority a text on neurology
which contains material beyond even his own understanding. The purpose
for inclusion of this method is to place only reliable sources before the
jury, but the method of implementation must be altered if it is to be
effective.
The Federal Rules appear to have directly confronted still another
issue-the admission of treatises on inexact sciences. Rule 8-03(b) (18)
specifically alludes to "treatises, periodicals, or pamphlets on a subject of
• ..medicine, or other science . ..

"'

To date, few jurisdictions have

allowed use of medical or other inexact authority because the state of
such sciences are predominantly dynamic and unsettled. 82 These inductive
sciences are generally thought too untrustworthy for admission except in
circumstances where better evidence is not available. There may be some
merit in the statement that it is not the entire body of such science that
is changing but only a mere segment. 8' When viewed, however, in the
light of the minimal degree of necessity provided, the trustworthiness
should not be considered substantial enough to justify exception. Finally,
by inclusion of pamphlets and periodicals, the rule invites use of articles
of predominatly experimental or forensic character.' It is not certain that
the basis for establishing their authority is to be different than that
required of treatises. Possibly there should be a limitation upon their
use beyond merely requiring that it be published and deemed authoritative by a single and possibly biased witness. There could, for example,
be a requirement of giving notice of their use to the opposing party,
thereby affording him time to rebut their reliability.' 6 5 It is submitted
that without additional restraints the use of such documents would prove
to be too untrustworthy.
160. Grubb, A Code of Evidence for Wisconsin?, 1946 Wis.L.REv. 81.
161. FED. R. EVID. 8-03(b) (18), 46 F.R.D. 161, 349 (Prelim. Draft 1969).
162. "The reasons for this usual rule [treatises inadmissible] are because of the
unsettled conditions of the sciences themselves ....
".Bowlesv. Bourdon, 148 Tex. 1,
219 S.W.2d 779 (1949).
163. 6 WIGMORE § 1692.
164. See note 38 supra and accompanying text.
165. See note 50 supra.
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CONCLUSION

Rule 8-03(b) (18) is impractical and academically unsound in its
attempt to admit learned treatises as substantive evidence. It is said to be
an illustration-of Rule 8-03(a)."' In its complexity, however, it offers
no guide to further application of this generality. It merely serves to
admit learned treatises in a single restricted context. Furthermore, the
illustration is not to be a limitation of the rule.167 If this theory were
carried to its logical extreme, it might provide a license for admission of
learned treatises on grounds more liberal than those contemplated by the
proposed standards. Therefore, Rule 8-03(b)(18) is inadequate. It
neither provides direction for future employment of Rule 8-03 (a) nor
restricts its operation in respect to admission of learned treatises.
Even greater academic difficulties would arise by promulgation of
the Proposed Rule. By eliminating the requirement of necessity it is
drastically deviating from the common law model.' 68 It is therefore not
a synthesis of prior exceptions as alleged.'69 Furthermore, in altering the
principles of hearsay, this anomaly may foster serious curtailment of
sixth amendment rights. °
Finally, although the rule has confronted the problem of untrustworthiness, the alternatives provided have multiplied the impediments.'
In an attempt to expedite trial procedure, Rule 8-03(b) (18) may be
sacrificing an excess of the opponent's rights. The learned treatise
example, therefore, is unsuccessful, at least in view of the limited necessity
of receiving such evidence.
It is submitted, however, that in appropriate circumstances exception
for learned treatises is well-founded, e.g., when no better evidence is
available. It is suggested, then, that the Committee reexamine its position
and consider placing the illustration for learned treatises under Rule
8-04." ' In so doing, the Proposed Rules could accommodate the deficient
situation evidenced in malpractice cases 7 ' without sanctioning unlimited
and unnecessary use of learned treatises.
166.
167.

FED. R. Evw. 8-03(b), 46 F.R.D. 161, 345 (Prelim. Draft 1969).
Id.

168. See notes 74-121 supra and accompanying text.
169.

FED. R. EVID. 8-03, Advisory Committee's Note, 46 F.R.D. 161, 351 (Prelim.

Draft 1969).
170. See note 90 supra and accompanying text.
171. See notes 159-65 supra and accompanying text.
172. FED. R. EVID. 8-04, 46 F.R.D. 161, 377 (Prelim. Draft 1969).
173. See note 49 supra.
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